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I. Introduction
This Article addresses the status of free speech on contemporary public
and private university campuses.' There has been historically, and is now, no
consensus on the proper scope of free speech in general on campus. Doubtless
a number of considerations partially account for this lack of consensus. This
Article, however, focuses on one fundamental such consideration. In particular,
the Article adopts what might be called a loosely functionalist 2 approach.
The functionalism employed herein attends not so much to the functions of
freedom of speech, as to the functions of the contemporary university. As
employed here, the idea of a 'function' encompasses broad, sustained, significant
effects of the university on any aspect of its environment or on its own membership,
whether such effects are consciously intended or not.3 The idea of a university
function may include university aims, purposes, and missions, whether actual
or proposed, traditional or emerging, tangible or intangible, conservative or
insurgent, sustaining or disruptive, concrete or abstract, mundane or aspirational,
explicit or implicit, unreflective or critical.4
Functions of a university can thus vary in the extent to which they are
immediately contained within the university context, or else affect persons,
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
1 Thus the presence or absence of state action and the applicability of the first and
fourteenth amendments of the federal Constitution are not of central concern herein. We also do not
especially emphasize below the obvious differences among universities in size, geography, prestige,
endowment, religious orientation, selectivity, co-educational status, and identity as an historically
black college or university.
2 The loosely functional approach adopted herein encompasses what are called manifest
and latent functions, and is intended to be compatible with institutional critique of the university,
of any depth and direction. For general inspiration, see the classic formulation in Robert K. Merton,
Social Theory and Social Structure ch. III (rev. ed. 1968) (elaborating in particular on the distinction
between manifest and latent institutional functions). See also Melvin Tumin, The Functionalist
Approach to Social Problems, 12 Social Probs. 379 (1965); Whitney Pope, Durkheim as a Functional
ist, 16 Sociological Q. 361 (1975). For a critique, see Paul Helm, Manifest and Latent Functions,
21 Phil. Q. 51 (1971). We make no assumptions as to any broader merits or limits of sociological
functionalism in general.
3 See the authorities cited supra note 2. Most of the major potential functions of the
university will have conscious defenders, but we should hold open the possibility that a particular
function of a university could play a role in university speech policy even in the absence of much
conscious reflection on that function.
4 See id
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institutions, cultures, and other entities beyond the university setting, though
drawing any such lines will often be difficult, if not hopeless.
The key assumption below is a blend of descriptive, predictive, and normative
considerations. The crucial assumption is this: there are various sorts of university
free speech cases, but whatever the case, sensible university free speech rules and
policies will tend to, and perhaps should, largely reflect what the various decision
makers and others take to be important relevant functions of the university'
The crucial step is then to recognize that in our era, the speech-relevant
functions of the university will be not only plural and various,' but divergent, and
for practical purposes, irreconcilably conflicting. The irreconcilability of partially
conflicting university functions -- in the clearest cases, partial conflicts in explicitly
articulated visions of the university -- is fundamental to understanding the nature
of campus free speech issues today.
Thus university campus speech policies become contestable, and often
irresolvably so, when they implicate some aspect of the unresolved conflicts
among partially competing understandings of university function, purpose, and
mission. Any given person, group, or institution, on or off campus, may well reject
one or more of the commonly asserted university functions. But this does not
fundamentally change -- indeed, it helps to constitute -- the underlying dynamic
of conflicting visions of university function and thus of speech on campus.
If this functionalist approach is on the right track, we should expect genuine
consensus on the range of potential campus speech cases only if and when
universities are widely thought to have some single identified and coherent basic
function, or at least some hierarchical, weighted, harmonized, or otherwise non-
conflicting plural set of such functions. Absent such unlikely developments, we
should expect speech policies on campus to be typically subject to irreconcilable
contest.8
And if we reasonably assume persistent incompatibilities among conceptions
of university functions,9 then a certain futility must attach to advocacy in
5 Thus university functions can be mostly internal or even intrinsic, or else mostly external in
their reference.
6 It may be possible to sensibly decide some university speech cases on grounds entirely
independent of any putative major function or purpose of a university, and such function-independent
grounds may well supplement a functionalist approach to some university speech cases. But we
should not expect considerations foreign to any purported function of the university to usefully
guide the apt resolution of typical university speech cases. Concisely put, considerations extrinsic
to university functions will rarely be of primary importance in adjudicating university speech cases.
For the role of functionalism or purposivism in free speech law, see the references cited infra note 25.
7 See infra Sections 11-1III.
8 A university whose operation is genuinely dominated by the pursuit of some single
coherent basic function or goal could still experience some degree of dissensus on basic free speech
issues. But in such hypothetical circumstances, we should expect the scope and frequency, if not the
emotional intensity, of free speech conflicts to be meaningfully reduced.
9 Competing visions of university functions may be irreconcilable, for reasons of sustained
conflicts in economic and other material group interest, cultural conflicts, conflicting visions of
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endorsing or rejecting any normative theory of campus speech in practice. We
should, however, continue to look for and reflect upon genuine overlaps and
commonalities of commitment.
To illustrate these themes, this Article considers some of the most prominent
discussions, descriptive and normative, of basic university functions.0 Among
such discussions, thorough and comprehensive inventories of the diverse such
basic university functions are uncommon." The more typical approach is to focus
on some preferred or conspicuous limited set of or single such functions,1 2 even
if the single function is itself then differentiated into related components. Such
treatments then commonly defer to or endorse some favored view, 3 while perhaps
alluding to some alternative view in adversary fashion. In pursuit, ultimately futile,
of common ground, the discussion below takes up in particular the popular theme
of the university as manifesting or somehow committed to overall community and
particular communities,1 4 to practices of civility,'" and to genuine conversation.'6
The idea of community, however, inescapably poses as many unresolved questions
as answers.
In the context of these varied conceptions of university function, the Article then
more concretely addresses apparently intractable debates over, specifically, hostile
and hate speech on the contemporary university campus;" limits on speech by
university faculty on matters of public interest;'" and cases of controversial speech
by university students transitioning to entry into a profession with certification or
other relevant requirements.1 9 Based on these considerations, a brief Conclusion
then follows. 20
the good or just society, and conflicts among values. Such value conflicts could involve not only
freedom of speech in general, but dignity, equality, opportunity, well-being, material and cultural
progress, civility, community, knowledge, and harmony, as well as conflicts internal to the value of
free speech itself. Such conflicts may well contribute to the actual shape of conflicting views of the
proper functions of a university It is also possible that a sense of the proper functions of a university
might affect our views on how to adjudicate among these various conflicts of interests and values.
10 See infra Sections II-III.
11 See infra Sections II. Loosely relatedly, Professor Steven Brint has referred to multiple
purposes or dimensions of college student development: "social, personal, academic, civic, and
economic." Steven Brint, The Multiple Purposes of an Undergraduate Education, available at www.
cshe.berkeley.edu /publications/ research-university (October, 2015) (visited February 21, 2016).
12 See infra Sections II-III.
13 See id.
14 See infra Section III.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See infra Section IV
18 See infra Section V
19 See infra Section VI.
20 See infra Section VII.
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II. Diverse and Conflicting Understandings of Basic University Functions
There is no single canonical formulation of the various basic functions of the
contemporary university. If we look, merely to begin with, to the historically
prestigious English universities, we find a quite understandable emphasis on
an assumed coherence, if not unity, as opposed to unresolved conflict, among
university functions and purposes. Thus the University of Cambridge announces
that its mission "is to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning,
and research at the highest international levels of excellence." 21 The potential for
conflict of functions on even this understanding may depend partly upon whether
we focus here on the arguably unitary idea of contributing to society, or on the
unfortunately complex relations between student learningr and faculty research.23
Cambridge University then declares itself to hold two core values.24 These
are "freedom of thought and expression, "25 and "freedom from discrimination." 26
Together with the above Cambridge Mission Statement, these core values could
be unpacked to implicate a number of possible university functions. But there is
21 The University's Mission and Core Values, available at www.cam.ac.uk/about-the-
university / how-the-university-and-colleges-work (visited January 3, 2016).
22 One would hope that the compatibility of, at a minimum, education and learning could be
taken for granted.
23 At the very least, even this formula implicates the traditionally debated relationship -
perhaps mutually supportive, or conflicting -- between classroom teaching and professorial research.
For a start, note the unabashed emphasis on research, as distinct from teaching, in Robert Maynard
Hutchins, The Spirit of the University of Chicago, 1 J. Higher Educ. 5, 5 (1930), and the emphasis on
teaching in John Henry Newman, The Idea of a University 1 (Aeterna Press ed., 2015) (1852).
24 See The University's Mission and Core Values, supra note 21.
25 Id. For recent descriptions of the basic functions and purposes of freedom of expression in
general, see Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1015 (2015); Brian
C. Murchison, Speech and the Truth-Seeking Value, 39 Colum. J.L. & Arts 55 (2015). Classically, see
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays ch. II (John Gray ed., 1991) (1859) ("On the Liberty of
Thought and Discussion"). For a brief popular exposition, see Steven Pinker, Why Free Speech Is
Fundamental, available at www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/01/26 (visited January 25, 2016).
In general, functionalist approaches to freedom of speech often refer to values such as the
pursuit of truth, democratic self-governance, and the promotion of autonomy. As a practical matter,
though, the appropriate role of each of these and other functionalist approaches to freedom of speech
is persistently contested. For a sampling of mutually incompatible perspectives on the pursuit of truth
as a function of free speech, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,
27 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 964-66 (1978); Stanley Ingber, The Markeplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 Duke L.J. 1; Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in The Theory of Free Expression,
60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 696 (1987); Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for
Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 Va. L. Rev. 595 (2011). For conflicting contemporary
views on the relationship between free speech and promoting democracy, see Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Free Speech Without Democracy, 49 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 59 (2015); James Weinstein, Participatory
Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 Va. L. Rev. 491 (2011). For hate
speech on campus as arguably tending to impair the autonomy, in the relevant sense, of its targets,
at least as much as it may genuinely promote the autonomy of its speakers, see R. George Wright,
Traces of Violence: Gadamer, Habermas, and the Hate Speech Problem, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 991
(2000).
26 The University's Mission and Core Values, supra note 21.
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certainly no effort here by Cambridge to endorse or reject some broadly inclusive
explicit typology of basic university functions. And yet, even the most casual
reflection raises the possibility of conflict between, for example, Cambridge's
commitments to freedom of expression and to freedom from discrimination in any
robust sense.27
As an example of a perhaps more consciously plural formulation of university
functions, we might consider that of President Amy Gutmann of the University of
Pennsylvania. 28 President Gutmann indicates that the "tripartite mission" 29 of the
university in general30 embraces "increasing educational opportunity, optimizing
creative understanding, and contributing the fruit of that understanding to
society." 3 1 This formulation, whether intended to be broadly encompassing or
not, does not explicitly identify any possible conflicts among the cited university
purposes. It would nonetheless be sensible to recognize that even the reference
to "optimizing" 3 2 creative understanding implicitly grants the reality of at least
some sort of resource tradeoff, if not some deeper conflict, between creative
understandings and other university functions and purposes.
With a similarly plural focus, Michigan State University President Lou Anna
K. Simon asserts that for her institution, "[t]he basic purposes of the University
are the advancement, dissemination, and application of knowledge,"33 with "[t]
he most basic condition for the achievement of these purposes [being] freedom
of expression and communication." 34 This commitment is importantly prefaced,
though, by defining her university as a "community, " in particular, as a
27 See infra Sections III, IV, and VI. By way of comparison, the University of Oxford
Strategic Plan 2013-18 comprises numerous elements, with no apparent attempt to distinguish those
elements that might amount to basic university functions or purposes. See www.ox.ac.uk/about/
organisation /strategic-plan (visited January 3, 2016).
28 Amy Gutmann, The Fundamental Worth of Higher Education, 158 Proceedings Am. Phil.
Society 136 (2014), available at www.upenn.edu/president/images/president/pdfs (2012) (visited
January 3, 2016).
29 Id. at 137.
30 See id.
31 Id.
32 Id. President Gutmann explicitly notes the possibility of conflicts, in educating for
democratic citizenship, between the values of individuality or autonomy and social diversity. See
Amy Gutmann, Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 Ethics 557 (1995). More broadly, see Amy
Gutmann, Democratic Education chs. 6-7 (rev. ed., 1999); Nel Noddings, Education and Democracy
in the 21st Century ch. 10 (2013).
33 Lou Anna K. Simon, President's Statement on Free Speech Rights and Responsibilities
1, available at http: / /president.msu.edu /communications/ statements/ free-speech.html (visited
January 3, 2016). See also Stanley Fish, Versions of Academic Freedom: From Professionalism to
Revolution 132 (2014) ("[t]he values of advancing knowledge and discovering truth are not extrinsic
to academic activity; they constitute it").
34 See Simon, supra note 33.
35 Id.
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"community of scholars," 6 explicitly encompassing the university's students."
The complex relationships between preserving various forms of community and
freedom of expression are noted separately below."
Another prominent university president, Drew Gilpin Faust of Harvard, refers
to a number of possible university functions with obvious potential for mutual
conflict. President Faust refers to "economic justifications for universities,"3 9
including the university as "a source of economic growth," 40 as well as to "a
market model of university purpose," 41 as contrasted with "narratives of liberal
learning, disinterested scholarship, and social citizenship,"42 and then further to
the university's role as "society's critic and conscience."' Whether we take these
enumerated university functions to be exhaustive or not, the potential for serious
conflict, if not overt antagonism, among these distinct functions seems evident.4
Taken in the aggregate, along with complementary discussions below, 45 these
36 Id.
37 See id. See also the attempt by John W. Boyer of the University of Chicago to respectively or
jointly prioritize "critical thinking, writing, and argumentation;" a "capacity for bold, self-confident
questions," and "civility and respect for intellectual divergence." At a minimum, there can be no
guarantee of compatibility between what one person or group takes to be bold, critical argumentation,
and another person or group takes to be incivility. See John W. Boyer, An Introduction to the Annual
Lecture on the Aims of Education (2016), available at http://aims.uchicago.edu/page/history
(visited February 21, 2016). For a recent discussion of possible conflicts between the university as a
bazaar of perhaps heterodox competing ideas and associated offensiveness, distress, rudeness, and
any resulting cacophony, see Doe v. Rector and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 E Supp. 3d 602,
607 (E.D. Va.) (quoting Kim v. Coppin State Coll., 662 E2d 1055, 1064 (4th Cir. 1981)).1981)).
38 See infra Section III.
39 Drew Gilpin Faust, The University's Crisis of Purpose, available at www.nytimes.
com/2009 / 09/06/books/ review/ Faust (visited January 3, 2016).
40 Id. at 3.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. President Faust is at this point drawing upon the work of former Dean George Fallis of
York University in Toronto.
44 President Faust also recognizes the essential conflict between the university's disinterested
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, however this idea might be clarified, and providing various
sorts of material, immediate benefits to the society See id. at 1.
45 See, e.g., the institutionally-focused suggestionby ProfessorGordonGrahamthatuniversities
should promote the university's transcendence of pure vocationalism; of pure utilitarianism in
research; and of financial and legal dependence upon the state, or more positively phrased, the value
of university autonomy. See Gordon Graham, Universities: The Recovery of an Idea 5-6 (2d ed.
2008), and at the individual level, the typology offered by Professor Harry Brighouse of the aims
to which the well-educated student should aspire: "personal autonomy; the ability to contribute to
social and economic life broadly understood; personal flourishing; democratic competence; and the
capacity for cooperation." Harry Brighouse, Moral and Political Aims of Education, in The Oxford
Handbook of Philosophy of Education 35, 37 (Harvey Siegel, ed.) (2009) (available online at www.
oxfordhandbooks. com). At this point, note merely the classic potential for tragic conflict between
the goals of personal autonomy and of genuine group or institutional flourishing.
Crucially, though, even if the basic functions of the university are to some degree inseparable
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various accounts provide some sense of the range of possible basic university
functions, with at least a minimal sense of potential conflicts among such functions.
Let us elaborate a bit further on the range and disparate nature of typically cited
basic university functions, whether endorsed and desired, or merely acknowledged
or critiqued, by any given observer.
Classically, Plato drew a distinction between paideia, or culture, and the
mere training of a particular capacity, or between perfection of character and the
enhancement of power.46 The cultivation of mind has thus long been seen as a
fundamental duty.4 7 In founding the University of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson
sought "[t]o develop the reasoning faculties of our youth, enlarge their minds,
cultivate their morals, and instill in them the precepts of virtue and order." 48 If
such purposes are re-formulated, in contrast, with no explicit moral or
character element, the basic educational aim, pursued through acquainting
oneself "with the best that has been thought and said in the world" 49 is then
judged by Matthew Arnold to be "to get to know [oneself] and the world.""o
This general emphasis on the cultivation of the self, in one respect or another,
can plainly both support and conflict with a variety of broad social goals.
Consider, in this respect, the popular view that a university education should
prepare the student to play a role in strengthening the broad democratic
political system, through capable and responsible democratic citizenship.
and mutually interdependent, this hardly precludes their mutual conflict. For a strong claim of
mutual interdependence among basic university functions, see the argument of Karl Jaspers, The
Idea of the University (H.A.T. Reiche & H.P Vanderschmidt, trans.) (Beacon Press ed., 1959) (1946)
(citing, as the three basic functions of the university, "professional training, education of the whole
man, research," with the university thus serving as, indissolubly, "a professional school, a cultural
center, and a research institute").
46 See 2 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture 133-34 (Gilbert Highet trans.,
1986) (1943).
47 See Immanuel Kant, Education § 12, at 11 (A. Churton trans., 1900) (1960 ed.) (1803) ("[m]
an's duty is to improve himself; to cultivate his mind").
48 Thomas Jefferson, Report of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia, in Writings
457, 460 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (1818). See also John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning
Education § 134, at 104-05 (2000) (1698) (on education for "Virtue, Wisdom, Breeding, and Learning").
49 Matthew Arnold, Thoughts On Education 243 (Leonard Huxley ed., 1912). The broad
knowledge acquisition function is of broader ideological interest. See VI. Lenin, The Tasks of the
Youth Leagues, in The Lenin Anthology 663 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1975) ("assimilating the wealth of
knowledge amassed by mankind" as essential to being a Communist).
50 Arnold, supra note 49, at 243. Similarly, if naively, Goethe's Faustian student reports to
Mephistopheles that "I should like to be erudite; and from the earth to heaven's height know every
law and every action. . . ." Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust (part I) 197 (Walter Kaufman trans.)
(1990 ed.) (1808). More recently, Professor Daniel Bell echoes Matthew Arnold in declaring that the
university can serve to "liberate young people by making them aware of the forces that impel them
from within and constrict them from without." Daniel Bell, Reforming General Education, available
at wwwciktegcolurbiaedu /core sites core/filea'1f (February 28, 1966) (visited January 5,
2016). On such theories, the image of the "committed faculty member" interacting with "an engaged
student," as classically in "Mark Hopkins on one end of a log and a student on the other," can arise.
Michael S. McPherson & Morton Owen Schapiro, Mark Hopkins and the Log-On 10, 10, available at
www.educause.eu /rub/e/ t (May / June 2002) (visited January 5, 2016).
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Thus according to President Derek Bok, for example, today's universities
provide not only various sorts of discoveries,"' and trained, knowledgeable
professionals,5 2 but the developed capacity to "strengthen our democracy by
educating its future leaders; preparing students to be active, knowledgeable
citizens; and offering informed critiques of government programs and policies.""
A university's emphasis on social justice could be encompassed hereunder. More
concisely, President Robert M. Hutchins argued that "[t]he college ... meets the
needs of society indirectly by making some contribution toward the formation of
good citizens." 54
Democratic citizenship is thus typically assumed to be not simply a matter
of directly supporting the current operations of the established political system.
The university may also be thought to serve the purpose of providing critique.
Again, this could encompass a university's social justice mission. On such a
view, the university may "serve the public culture by asking questions the public
doesn't want to ask, investigating subjects it cannot or will not investigate, and
accommodating voices it fails or refuses to accommodate."5 6
The university thus need not be seen as invariably endorsing or reinforcing all
important aspects of the broader society, even if that society invests in, financially
sustains, attempts to guide, and crucially depends upon various aspects of
university functioning. The university's manifold relationships with the broader
society's politics, economy, social justice practices, and culture will inevitably be
contested, both on campus, and between the campus and elements of the broader
society.
A bit more concretely, writers such as Dean Anthony Kronman have more
specifically suggested that among the "non-economic contributions" 7 made by
contemporary
51 See Derek Bok, Higher Education in America 1 (rev. ed., 2015).
52 See id.
53 Id. See also Richard Arum & Josipa Roksa, Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on
College Campuses 31 (2011) ("[r]egardless of economic competitiveness, the future of the democratic
society depends upon educating a generation of young adults who can think critically, reason deeply,
and communicate effectively").
54 Robert M. Hutchins, The College and the Needs of Society, 3 J. Gen. Educ. 175, 181 (1949).
See also id. at 179 (on the university function of encouraging thoughtful citizenship).
55 See Bok, supra note 51 at 1. There may, however, turn out to be a sort of long-term
contradiction between promoting the value of democracy, even on pragmatic grounds, and
academically popular skeptical approaches to metaethics, freedom and autonomy, the dignity of the
person, and materialism.
56 Louis Menand, The Marketplace of Ideas 158 (2010). More elaborately, but outside the
formal academic setting, see Plato, Apology, in Five Dialogues 21, 34 (John M. Cooper, trans.) (2d
ed., 2002) (-399 BCE) ("gadfly" metaphor). Within official academia, see Report of the Committee
on Freedom of Expression at Yale (Woodward Report) (December 23, 1974), available at httR pd"
(visited January 15, 2016) (re the right to
"challenge the unchallengeable").
57 Anthony T. Kronman, Education's End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have Given
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universities is "the cultivation of habits of respectfulness and tolerance on which
responsible citizenship in a democracy depends."" The quality of tolerance is
then linked with the potentially distinct virtue of open-mindedness.59
Finally, but arguably of greatest importance, one might look for basic university
functions, and for elemental conflicts therein, as well in the realm of social and
economic production and stratification. The university may to one degree or
another reflect a pre-existing status hierarchy,60 or may help to determine and
perhaps legitimize, reproduce, and solidify a status hierarchy.' As to any of these
university functions, one might again be supportive, indifferent, or critical.6 2
In any event, the contemporary university clearly operates as a linkage, of
whatever sort, between future employees, civil servants, and entrepreneurs,
and their actual post-university social and economic opportunities, niches, and
outcomes. 3 American universities of a century ago accommodated perhaps
a mere five percent of the college age population.64 Today, the figure is closer
to 60 percent." These figures suggest the possibility, if not the fulfilment, of a
university's catalyzing the social and economic mobility of groups historically
underrepresented within the various professions.6
It is certainly possible, though, to support nearly any program of mobility,
Up on the Meaning of Life 38 (2007). See also Stefan Collini, What Are Universities For? 87 (2012)
(beyond today's "semi-marketized, employment-oriented institutions, there remains a strong
popular desire that they should, at their best, incarnate a set of 'aspirations and ideals' that go
beyond any form of economic return").
58 Kronman, supra note 57, at 38.
59 Id. See also Andrew Delbanco, College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be 3 (2011 ed.) (arguing
that colleges should promote, among other personal qualities of mind, "[a] willingness to imagine
experience from perspectives other than one's own") (to which one might add the underlying
capacity to do so, with some degree of fidelity).
60 See, e.g., Daniel Bell, About the Reforming of General Education, 37 Am. Scholar 401,
401 (1968). See also Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks 26 (Quintin Hoare &
Geoffrey Nowell Smith, trans.) (1971 ed.) (-1930).
61 See Bell, supra note 60, at 401. For brief discussion in a much broader educational context,
see Antonio Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader chs. II, X (David Forgacs ed., 1988).
62 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 60, at 401.
63 Henry Giroux argues that "the university is gradually being transformed into a training
ground for the corporate workforce." Henry A. Giroux, On Critical Pedagogy 112 (2012 ed.). See
also Peter J. Stokes, Higher Education and Employability: New Models For Integrating Study and
Work (2015). Debates as to how universities perform this function, and their efficiency in doing so,
are secondary to whether or the degree to which the universities should serve such a function. For a
critique, see Joseph Arum & Josipa Roksa, Aspiring Adults Adrift (2014).
64 See Faust supra note 39, at 2.
65 See id. Earlier, Clark Kerr had noted the "transition from elite to mass access to universal
access higher education," however incomplete or contested the transition. Clark Kerr, Higher
Education: Paradise Lost?, 7 Higher Educ. 261, 266 (1978). See also Collini, supra note 57, at 41.
66 See, e.g., Collini, supra note 57, at 92 (2012). On some scale, such a function has of course
long been undertaken by historically black college and universities. For background, see the
contributions to Historically Black College and Universities (Charles L. Betsy, ed.) (2008).
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opportunity, and equality7 without broadly endorsing contemporary university
practices in that regard, let alone judging such practices to be central to
the fundamental purposes of the university. Consider in this regard the
uncompromising language of philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre:
The aim of a university education is not to fit students for this or that particular
profession or career, to equip them with theory that will later on find useful
application to this or that form of practice. It is to transform their minds, so that
the student becomes a different kind of individual, one able to engage fruitfully
in conversation and debate, one who has the capacity for exercising judgment, for
bringing insights and arguments from a variety of disciplines to bear on particular
complex issues.8
Thus there is, as Robert M. Hutchins noted, "a conflict between one aim of the
university, the pursuit of truth for its own sake, and another which it professes
too, the preparation of men and women for their life work."6 9 Hutchins also
contrasts his favored conception of the university as "a center of independent
thought"7 o with, respectively, conceptions of the university as "service-station,"71
"public-entertainment," 72 and "housing-project." Each of these latter conceptions
exercises some contemporary influence, and thereby exacerbates the functional
contradictions of the university.
However we choose to classify the various basic functions and purposes of
the university, we are left with potential conflicts and practical contradictions.
Consider together the incomplete and overlapping census of basic university
functions above: learning and research; 74 anti-discrimination;75  providing
67 For an inventory of fundamental approaches to the idea of distributional equality, see R.
George Wright, Equal Protection and the Idea of Equality, 34 L. & Inequality 1 (2016).
68 Alasdair MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities 147 (2009) (at this point largely endorsing
the perspective of John Henry Newman). One could certainly argue that these are among the
qualities that promote long-term success in business and the professions. If the Newman-MacIntyre
approach is pressed to an extreme, it becomes transformed into the claim that "the distinguishing
mark of universities, as opposed to other institutions of further and higher education, is their concern
with knowledge and the pursuit of learning for their own sake, not for the sake of some external
practical end." Graham, supra note 45, at 28 (discussing, rather than unequivocally endorsing, such
a view).
69 Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America 33 (2009 ed.) (1936). Roughly
this conflict was earlier articulated by Thorstein Veblen. See Thorstein Veblen, The Higher Learning
in America 68 (Richard E Teichgraber ed., 2015) (1918) (noting the conflict between "the needs of
the higher learning and the demands of business enterprises"). See also Christopher Dawson, The
Crisis of Western Education 149 (2010 ed.) (1961) (the modern technological order as requiring that
university-level and general education be coordinated with the needs of business and industry).
70 Robert M. Hutchins, The Freedom of the University, 61 Ethics 95, 104 (1951).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. The expansion of these latter functions is ascribed by Hutchins to the need, or the
temptation, "to get money." Id.
74 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
75 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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educational opportunities and making societal contributions;7'6 advancement of
knowledge;77  freedom of expression and communication;78  promoting
economic growth; 79 disinterested scholarship; 0 serving as societal critic;8 '
moral cultivation of the students;8 2 professional training;" preparation for
competent democratic citizenship;84 reflecting or determining status and
opportunity hierarchies or promoting social mobility; " and fundamental
personal transformation. 6
The potential for conflict within, as well as among, any such set of university
functions is clear enough in general, and almost equally clearly in the more
particular area of campus speech. If there were to be any hope of wringing harmony
out of conflict, the likeliest possibility would seem to be through emphasizing the
concept, briefly alluded to above, 7 of community. But as we shall now see, the
idea of community actually contributes more to the intractability of the problems
of campus speech than it does to their consensual resolution.
III. Community, University Function,and Campus Speech
The linkages between various forms and senses of community and the
university are multiple, and in some respects contested. The most basic such
linkages may be at the level not precisely of the functions of a university, but of the
very definition of a university. Thus it has been variously argued that the university
is a community;" that it is an aggregate of multiple or diverse communities;8 9
that the university aspirationally should be a community, whether that ideal is
76 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
77 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
79 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
80 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
81 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
82 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
83 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
86 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
87 See supra text accompanying notes 35-37. For a sense of a possible conjunction of the
general pursuit of knowledge with an individually or collectively experienced imaginative zest and
excitement therein, see Alfred North Whitehead, Universities and Their Function (1927), available at
er / (visited February 21, 2016).
88 See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
89 See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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realized in practice or not;90 that the experience of university community should
be optional; 9' and that the university should promote some form of community in
the broader society beyond the campus boundaries.92 The very idea of community
and disputes over the nature of the university thus open the possibility of multi-
front conflict, as much as to harmony.
At the level of language itself, the word 'college' refers to an association, if not
to a genuine community.93 From the beginning, the university amounted to "an
association of masters and scholars leading the common life of learning."94 It is thus
natural to think of the traditional, geographically localized,95 non-cyber university
as a community,96 and perhaps in particular as a community of scholars, 97 however
broadly or narrowly defined. 98 Ironically, it is also natural, but distinctly different,
to think of community as an aspirational ideal toward which the university ought
to strive,99 or even of the university residential or scholarly community as a model
community for emulation on much larger scales.'00
90 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
91 See infra notes 109, 112 and accompanying text.
92 See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
93 See Robert S. Rait, Life in the Medieval University 5 (Forgotten Books ed., 2015)
(Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 1918) (1912). The classic distinction between a mere association and a
genuine community is elaborated in Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society [Gemeinschaft und
Gesellschaft] 226-32 (Charles P Loomis trans.) (Dover ed., 2002) (1887). Very roughly, this distinction
gestures at differences between family and small village life on the one hand and city life on the other.
See id. For some relevant contemporary developments, see Marc J. Dunkelman, The Vanishing
Neighbor: The Transformation of American Community (2014); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone:
The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000).
94 Charles Homer Haskins, The Rise of Universities 24 (1965 ed.) (1923). See also Clark Kerr,
The Uses of the University 1 (1964) ("[t]he university started as a single community -- a community
of masters and students"); Jacques Barzun, The American University 244 (2d ed. 1993) (1968).
95 Thus one might decline to think of, say, the University of California system, or the California
State University system, as a whole, as genuine communities. See Daniel Bell, About The Reforming
of General Education, 37 Am. Scholar 401, 403 (1968).
96 See, e.g., Ellen Condliffe Lagemann & Harry Lewis, Renewing the Civic Mission of
American Higher Education, in What Is College For?: The Public Purpose of Higher Education 9, 11
(Ellen Condliffe Lagemann & Harry Lewis eds., 2012) ("[c]ollege are communities"). See also Healy
v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171 (1972) (referring to "the academic community" in the context of potential
tradeoffs among free expression and campus orderliness and non-disruption).
97 See, e.g., Michael Oakeshott, The Idea of a University, available at www.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/
irwinking 23 24 (originally published 1950) ("a university ... is a corporate body of scholars, each
devoted to a particular branch of learning: what is characteristic is the pursuit of learning as a co-
operative enterprise. . . . A university . . . is a home of learning") (emphasis added); Simon, supra
note 33, at 1 ("Michigan State University is a community of scholars whose members include its
faculty, staff, students, and administrators").
98 See Simon, supra note 33, at 1.
99 See Robert Paul Wolff, The Ideal of the University 127 (1969) ("[t]he ideal university ... is a
community of learning") (emphasis in the original). Professor Wolff elaborates: "a university ought
to be a community of persons united by collective understandings, by common and communal goals,
by bonds of reciprocal obligation, and by a flow of sentiment which makes the preservation of the
community an object of desire, not merely a matter of prudence or a command of duty").
100 Howard Gardner, Discussion, in William G. Bowen, Higher Education in the Digital Age 97,
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The potential for conflicting impulses in free speech cases begins to emerge,
however, if we believe that the university, whether itself a community or not,
encompasses a plurality of communities,' perhaps for quite distinct purposes.
Even if the various campus communities are somehow "nested,"102 or perhaps
otherwise related, there can be no guarantee of harmony 3 of purposes among
the various constituent campus communities.
At the level of the university itself, and of its various constituent
communities, meaningful community typically requires "people of like
purpose."10 4  The members must share, in the words of John Dewey, "aims,
beliefs, aspirations, knowledge -- a common understanding." 05  Thus
'community' refers to both a distinct kind of group, and to one or more qualities
shared by the group members.0 6 In the educational context, there may thus be "a
common zeal" 07 for "a common pursuit." 08
Absolute and exceptionless commitment to the broader university community,
however, may not be desirable,1 09 and is in any event not widely in evidence.
One element of campus multiculturalism could be described as promoting "safe
harbor" 0 communities of various sorts, within, but quite distinct from, a broader
campus community. The meaning of 'safety' itself may vary as among campus
groups. On occasion, the university may seek undue homogeneity in values
and in priorities, in the name of furthering the overall campus community. But
100 (2014 ed.). For the importance of community in the broader societal context, see Robert A. Nisbet,
The Quest For Community 30 (1973 ed.) (1953).
101 See Kerr, supra note 94, at 1 ("[t]oday the large American university is ... a whole series of
communities and activities"). See also the distinct sense in which each classroom, or more literally
each particular class, is or can be itself a genuine community, as outlined in bell hooks, Teaching to
Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom 8 (1994).
102 This term is adapted from John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1093, 1096
(2013).
103 Consider, by possible contrast, the community constituted by the well-functioning
symphony orchestra, as briefly elaborated in Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 Cal. L. Rev.
479, 493 (1989).
104 Barzun, supra note 94, at 244.
105 John Dewey, Democracy and Education 4 (Dover ed., 2004) (1916).
106 See Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism 163 (1968).
107 R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education 58 (1966).
108 Id.
109 See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Idea of the University: A Re-Examination 65 (1992) ("[i]t is not an
inconsistency to insist that the healthiest community ... is one in which scholars are not obliged to be
in the community incessantly, and therefore that one of the functions of the community of scholars is
to protect the right and need of the scholars in the community to be by themselves") (or, presumably,
within some sub-community).
110 See Jim Sidanius, et al., Ethnic Enclaves and the Dynamics of Social Identity on the College
Campus: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 87 J. Personality & Social Psych. 96, 96 (2004). The
university has long been thought of as a safe or protective space in other respects. See Collini, supra
note 57, at 56.
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insufficiently informed universalism can inadvertently depreciate some nested
campus cultures."' The broader campus community may or may not actually be
strengthened, over time, in such cases.
What is clear, in such cases, is the potential conflict between visions of the
overarching university community and the self-perceived interests of one or more
perhaps mutually quite distinct constituent campus communities. The university
community may thus be called upon to acknowledge the differences between
a constituent community's defensive, protective, partial withdrawal from the
broader campus community, and the inadvertently or insensitively imposed
isolation, burdening, or exclusion of that constituent community.112
Crucially, there are inherent contradictions between the broadly encompassing
campus community's functioning as a space for robust and uninhibited expression
and debate generally," 3 even on sensitive social issues, and as a space in which
responsible consideration and accommodation are broadly exercised on behalf of
all members of the campus community," 4 including those distinctly representing
diverse societally subordinated communities.
These contradictions among presumably basic university functions help to
account for the unresolvability of a substantial number of campus speech problems.
Actually, these contradictions, when manifested in campus speech contexts,
exemplify an even broader and more fundamental contradiction among basic
university functions: the inescapable conflict between the uninhibited pursuit of
knowledge and truth, as variously as those notions may currently be envisioned,"'
and the university's obvious need to somehow act, authoritatively, officially, and
uniformly, on the basis of such knowledge and truth, or approximations thereto,
as the university currently believes itself to possess."'
111 See, e.g., Roderick A. Ferguson, The Re-Order of Things: The University and Its Pedagogy
of Minority Differences 81 (2012).
112 See Sidanius, supra note 110, at 96; Pelikan, supra note 109, at 65. Concisely put, uninhibited
debate may well not be fully compatible with an assumed pre-existing genuine campus community.
The University of Chicago appears to endorse the former, even at some cost in the latter, but then
registers a number of function-based exceptions to that endorsement. See Report of the Committee
on Freedom of Expression, available at
(2015) (visited January 15, 2016). For a similar stance, see the Princeton University Faculty Statement,
available at wwLw rinceton edu.Lnain news /rchive (April 7, 2015) (visited January 15, 2016).
113 See supra notes 25, 33, 34, 69, 70 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 26, 58, 96, 99, 110 and accompanying text. Consider also the implications
for this conflict of classifying the promotion of social justice and broad sustainability as genuinely
basic university functions.
115 For a sense of the disparate contemporary understandings of the very idea of truth, see,
e.g., Timothy M. Mosteller, Theories of Truth: An Introduction (2014); Truth (Oxford Readings in
Philosophy) (Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons eds., 1999).
116 It is certainly possible to argue that at least some theories of knowledge or truth are not
themselves neutral with regard to the values, aims, interests, and priorities of minority communities
on campus. If so, then to whatever degree a given campus reflects such theories, there is the
possibility of either reduced or enhanced conflict between the uninhibited pursuit of truth, and the
values and interests of minority campus communities. This Article will not, however, assume that
concrete political, moral, or cultural implications are genuinely built into any popular theory of truth
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The university, in a phrase, cannot always defer action in the hope of obtaining
a better perspective through yet further pursuit of the truth. And in campus
speech contexts, the free pursuit of truth -- at least from the perspective of willing
speakers and listeners -- must inevitably remain distinct"7 from the responsible
exercise of that freedom, from the perspective of various other campus community
groups and members."8
IV. Plurality of Basic University Function
and the Problem of Hostile Speech
On Campus
Crucially because the university" 9 has some more or less familiar if contested
set of basic functions, campus speech in general, and hostile, offensive, or injurious
speech on campus 20 in particular, pose distinctive issues. In the latter kinds of
or knowledge. For broader discussion, see Simon Blackburn, Truth: A Guide (2007).
117 The campus cultural contradiction between freedom of inquiry and responsibility in inquiry
is not resolved merely by rhetorically pairing the ideas of freedom and responsibility conjunctively
See, e.g., Pelikan, supra note 109, at 58, 65. For an extended argument for supplementing and
tempering a speaker's freedom of expression with the values of civility, self-restraint, and respect,
see Edward Shils, The Virtue of Civility: Selected Essays on Liberalism, Tradition, and Civil Society
(Steven Grosby, ed.) (1997). See also Cheshire Calhoun, The Virtue of Civility, 29 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 251
(2000), and more broadly, the concept of a conversation, as developed in Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming
Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age (2015). The idea of a genuine conversation might
in turn be linkable to the idea of genuinely discursive public decision making, as in Jurgen Habermas,
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen
trans., 1990) (1983).
118 For present purposes, we set aside the otherwise increasingly important question of who is
to count, in the first place, as a member of any relevant campus community. This question notably
arises in the context of students whose connection with the physical or residential university campus
is largely or entirely virtual, or online, and in the context of the increasing percentages of adjunct and
temporary faculty, whose connection to any particular campus may in some respects be attenuated.
On the general question of virtual or remote college-level education, see, e.g., Nannerl 0.
Keohane, Higher Education in the Twenty-First Century: Innovation, Adaptation, Preservation, 46
PS: Political Science & Politics 102, 103 (2013); Frank B. McCluskey & Melanie L. Winter, Academic
Freedom in the Digital Age, 22 On the Horizon 136, 127 (2014). See also Jonathan Haber, MOOCs
(2014). On the role of adjunct or contingent faculty, see House Committee on Education and the
Workforce Democratic Staff, The Just-in-Time Professor, available at www mnsaneftorghoortals
(January, 2014) (visited January 15, 2016); Noam Chomsky, How America's Great University System
Is Being Destroyed (February 28, 2014), available at wwwaiternet.ora/con orateaccountbility-
andorzay c y (visited January 15, 2016); Delbanco, supra note 59, at 4-6.
119 Again, we do not herein emphasize the differences between public and private universities,
or other differences within each of these categories. See supra note 1.
120 We also set aside here questions of the increasingly murky, and as yet largely judicially
unresolved, boundaries between on-campus and off-campus, but directly campus-related, speech.
For a sense of some of the options at the pre-university level, see, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch.
Bd., 799 E3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Wynar v. Douglas Sch. Dist., 728 E3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013);
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 E3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mt. Sch. Dist.,
650 E3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 E3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
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cases, irreconcilable conflicts among arguably basic university functions largely
drive the conflicts in any observer's preferred case analyses and outcomes.
Consider in particular the problem of on-campus resort to invidious group
identity epithets. Even in the broader society, there is at least some impulse to
conclude that "such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. "121
This impulse would suggest that such epithet speech should not be considered
constitutionally protected speech, or perhaps even as speech at all in the sense
relevant to constitutional purposes. One might thus conclude that "[r]esort to
epithets or personal abuse is not in any sense communication of information or
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution. . . ."1 22
Such an approach might have a certain appeal in many contexts. With regard
to hostile speech on university campuses in particular, it would not be difficult to
link the Chaplinsky logic quoted above to one or more of the commonly cited basic
university functions and purposes. It has thus been argued that the university
prepares its students for tolerant, responsible democratic citizenship, and on some
theories, even seeks to build character in certain respects, while embodying or at
least striving for meaningful and mutually respectful community.1 2 3 On such views,
hostile epithet speech on campus seems contrary to basic university function and
purpose.
Undeniably, though, there are other conceptions of basic university function that
may fail to meaningfully address, or may reluctantly tolerate at the level of formal
legal sanction, some instances of distinctly and overtly hostile speech on campus.
Thus the university as bastion of free thought, free expression, the exploration
of ideas, and of free communication, at least for some speakers and listeners;124
the university as poser and prober of socially uncomfortable questions;1 25 and the
university as generator, reflector, reinforcer, and replicator of status hierarchies 26
could all be brought to bear on the side of the legal toleration of hostile speech on
campus.
These stark oppositions among arguably basic university purposes of course
require some refinement. No single basic university function is monolithic and
utterly unequivocal on all reasonable interpretations. Some basic university
functions can be internally contradictory in their implications for campus speech.
banc); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 E3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008).
121 Chaplinsky v. State, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
122 Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940)). More broadly, one might
easily argue that some of the leading discussions of free and open discussion on campus are not at
all logically committed to condoning the use of vulgar epithets. Consider, in this context, e.g., John
Henry Newman, supra note 23, at 473.
123 See supra notes 26, 35-37, 48, 53-54, 58, 88-90, 93-99 and accompanying text.
124 See, e.g., supra notes 25, 34, 70 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
126 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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Thus one might well argue that some instances of hostile campus speech can
suppress, rather than encourage, speech, including any possible "counter-speech,"
by the targets of such speech.1 27
Thus there are conflicts within each purported basic university function, as
well as among those basic functions. Crucially, though, it is unlikely that in all
instances of potential conflict among basic university functions, the conflicts
internal to each such function will be aligned, like the cylinders of a combination
lock, so as to generate some unique and largely uncontroversial outcome at the level
of basic university purpose. Realistically, the prominent basic university purposes,
however granulated or refined, individually and collectively will typically point
in opposing directions on questions of hostile speech, and on questions of campus
speech more broadly.
Nor is the interaction between jurisprudential free speech doctrine and basic
university functions likely to point toward an unequivocal solution. Consider the
language ultimately adopted in the classic hostile speech case of Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire.1 28 Chaplinsky declares to be constitutionally unprotected what
it calls "insulting or 'fighting' words -- those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."1 29 The crucial problem
with Chaplinsky is not one of systematic underprotectiveness of speech, but of
undue and unfortunate indeterminacy of judicial outcome, in light of the basic
university functions.
Many members of the university community sense that not all verbal insults
should be legally or administratively treated in similar ways. Some insults may
reflect not so much any social or political point, as some displaced
autobiographical personal resentment.13  More importantly, the most reasonable
legal, administrative, and moral responses to insults often depend upon prior
interactions, if any, between the relevant parties; their relationships; and any
relevant differences in statuses and power relationships. Asymmetries of power
often translate into asymmetries in the harms of insulting or abusive language,
including epithets.' 3  And the most significant harms of some insulting speech
may be either collective; as distinct from individualized,1 32 or cumulative and
aggregative, rather than being confined to the particular incident in question. 33
Thus while it is important to recognize that seriously intended insults may well
not be intended as contributions to a dialogue, or to any ongoing conversation or
127 See the authorities cited infra notes 131, 134.
128 See supra note 121.
129 Id. at 572.
130 Consider the classic essay by WH. Auden, Anger, in The Seven Deadly Sins 78,83 (2002 ed.) (192).
131 See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound (2004);
Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech ch. 1 (2012); Ronald Turner, On Free, Harmful, and
Hateful Speech, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 283 (2015).
132 See Waldron, supra note 131, at 4-6.
133 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 131, at 12, 117.
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exchange of ideas,1 34 not all genuinely insulting language has the same sorts of
effects. Consider, for example, a few of the calculated insults directed at Richard,
Duke of Gloucester by women nobility in Shakespeare's play: "Blush, blush, thou
lump of foul deformity;"'35 "Never hung poison on a fouler toad;" 36 "Villain, thou
know'st nor law of God nor man."' 37 Should even such unsparing insults, directed
at a remarkably unscrupulous would-be king, be judged the cultural equivalent
of invidious and directly targeted epithet speech, aimed at any of various identity
groups, on a contemporary campus? 38
The Chaplinsky case itself does not much reflect upon any relevant differences
among the class of insulting words that by their very utterance inflict one sort
of injury, or another.1 39 Nor is the more frequently litigated Chaplinsky second
prong or "fighting words" itself of determinate scope. The idea of words likely,
under the circumstances, to immediately provoke an average -- as distinct from
a 'reasonable' -- addressee to physically fight is locally historically conditioned,
culture-bound, and certainly far from neutral among cultures.1 40
The Chaplinsky Court's own attempt to provide guidance regarding this
second prong holds that "[t]he test is what men 41 of common intelligence would
understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight."" What
amounts to an unprotected fighting word is thus not left entirely to the person
making the decision, in the moment, to fight or not to fight.'" The courts are
instead to focus on the likely reaction of an "average addressee."144
In university campus cases, the Chaplinsky question thus requires attention to
134 For background, see Habermas, supra note 117; Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics
and Other Essays 304, 312 (reprint ed., 1984) (1962) (education in general and the university in
particular as crucially a matter of conversation); H.P Grice, Logic and Conversation, available at
http:/ ed-~e~edx~or- / asset-vlBrown 45 (on "conversationally unsuitable" moves) (visited January
20, 2016); Michael Oakeshott, The Idea of a University 25-26, available at www.cse.cuhk.edu.hkf
irvwin/king (1989) (1950) (visited January 20, 2016) ("[t]he pursuit of learning is not ... an argument
or a symposium; it is a conversation"). See also R. George Wright, Traces of Violence: Gadamer,
Habermas, and the Hate Speech Problem, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 991 (2001).
135 William Shakespeare, Richard III, act 1, scene 2, line 59 at 25 (Folger ed., 2014) (-1623).
136 Id. line 16 at 33.
137 Id. line 75 at 25.
138 Interestingly, the English medieval universities of very roughly Richard III's time may have
disciplined rather similarly what we might consider "scurrilous or offensive language" in general,
and invidious comparisons among countries, races, and sciences in particular. See Robert S. Rait,
Life in the Medieval University 65, 67 (Forgotten Books ed., 2015) (1912).
139 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
140 Nor does the first, or verbal injury, prong invariably balance out the second prong's lack of
cultural neutrality.
141 Note the assumption not so much that men will be doing the fighting, as that men, in
whatever sense, will be doing the judging.




any relevant attributes of what is somehow thought to be an average student. The
victim of fighting words in a given case may in reality have been targeted precisely
as a member of, say, a particular ethnic, racial, religious, or sexual minority. Is it
clear, though, that an average member of the campus community is a member of,
or sufficiently understands and identifies with, the relevant ethnic, racial, religious,
or sexual minority?
Atypical student who does not genuinely identify with any of the characteristics
or beliefs at issue in a given instance of possible fighting words will be unlikely to
react by physically fighting. The category of fighting words would then reflect the
characteristics, values, and beliefs of the dominant groups on campus, as distinct
from those of less represented groups. Redressing such a judicial injusticel45 would,
however, presumably take us back some distance from Chaplinsky toward a focus
on instead taking the victim of fighting words as we find her,46 with her relevant
characteristics.
By itself, then, Chaplinsky offers no stable solution to what should count as
fighting words, or as unprotected language, in campus incidents. On both the
inflicted injury prong and on the likely-to-fight prong, Chaplinsky invites, but
does not meaningfully specify, a choice as to how to conceive of the speech target
or victim. At the extremes, we might think of the victim as nearly an abstract,
bodiless, cultureless universal, and thus as unlikely to physically fight, whatever
sense of justice we ascribe to such an entity. Or we might instead take the victim
much more as we find her, including her sensitivities, but perhaps without what
the rest of us somehow take to be any inappropriate hypersensitivities on her
part.1 4 7 As to where, in between such extremes, 48 campus authorities and others
should focus their attention, the Chaplinsky test is silent.
The problem of hostile speech on campus is further complicated by doubts as to
the relevance, in some such cases, of the university function of free and uninhibited
discussion of issues and "learning through open debate and study."1 4 9 In cases of
campus hate speech, some persons may judge the best response to be one of "more
speech,"'so or counter-speech, as though such incidents were an implicit invitation
145 If not also an equal protection or civil rights violation.
146 See, e.g., People v. Stamp, 2 Cal. App. 3d 203,210, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 610 (1970); A.M. Honore,
Review: Legal Cause in the Law of Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 595, 600 (1964) (reviewing Professor Robert
M. Keeton's treatment).
147 Note that courts have occasionally felt up to the task of distinguishing between appropriate
sensitivity and legally unreasonable hypersensitivity in matters of religious response and belief. See,
e.g., Books v. Elkhart Cnty, 401 E3d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing authority).
148 Thinking of a victim in the most appropriate terms, somewhere between abstract, nearly
empty universalism and detailed, concrete particularism, poses issues similar to those associated
with the broader problem of a proper choice among levels of generality in description. See, e.g.,
Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1057 (1999).
149 This language is borrowed from the American Civil Liberties Union discussion Hate
Speech On Campus 2, available at wwwaclu~org'hatec (visited January 25, 2016).
150 See, classically, Justice Brandeis's nominal concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982) (citing
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to discussion, dialogue, and debate. But if at least some instances of campus hate
speech are, and are intended to be, largely assaultive speech, or akin to the tort
of battery committed through the medium of words,'"' the idea of counterspeech
may be not only unresponsive, but itself undignified.'52
Some campus authorities may believe more broadly that the most effective
overall response to hate speech involves generally exposing prejudice and fallacy
through open debate,' 3 and even that an official disciplinary response may be
"infantilizing and disempowering"15 4 to the targeted victims. This is partly an
empirical, but as well partly a normative, debate. Such debates cannot be resolved
until the relevant university functions have been settled upon and interpreted at a
sufficiently specific level. As we have seen, universities in general seem far from
any such settlement.
V. Plurality of Basic University Function
and the Problem of Professorial Speech
On Matters of Public Concern
For public employees in general, the scope of free speech protection from
adverse action by one's public employer is largely derived from the Supreme Court
case of Garcetti v. Ceballos.55 In such cases, Garcetti requires that for free speech
protection to attach, the public employee speech must have been on a subject of
public interest and concern; the employee's interest as a citizen in thus speaking
must outweigh the government employer's relevant interests in workplace order,
efficiency, discipline, confidentiality, and morale; and crucially that the speech
in question not have occurred within and pursuant to the scope of the public
employee's actual job responsibilities.'56
authority); ACLU, supra note 149, at 2; A.C. Grayling, Wimpering [sic] Students Need to Grow Up or
Get Out of University 2, available at wwxxTtelearaoh&&uk 'education 'educationorinion (December
4, 2015) (visited January 25, 2016).
151 See the authorities cited supra notes 131, 134.
152 See id.
153 See ACLU, supra note 149, at 2; Grayling, supra note 150, at 2.
154 Grayling, supra note 150, at 2. Professor Grayling begins his argument, interestingly, by
conceding that "[a] university ... should be a safe place for diverse ethnicities, sexualities, and
viewpoints. It should be a domain founded on tolerance and mutual respect, where no one feels
excluded or marginalized." Id.
155 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
156 See id. at 419-22. The Garcetti majority thus built upon the foundations of Pickering v. Bd.
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). To see the logic of the Garcetti
majority in this respect, one might think of speech within the scope of one's job responsibilities
as "hired" speech, with the content being bought, and specifiable, by the government employer,
as distinct from, for example, a letter by the public employee to a general newspaper editor, or an
occasional op-ed column.
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The possibility of the disciplinary sanctioning of public university professorial
speech, whatever the motive or political context, assuming merely that the speech
took place in the course of professional job responsibilities, perhaps reflecting the
speaker's distinct academic expertise, prompted an expression of concern on the
part of Justice Souter.1 7
The majority in Garcetti, however, merely set aside such academic freedom
concerns without prejudice. The majority thus acknowledged that
[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not
fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech jurisprudence.
We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct
today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to
scholarship or teaching.' 8
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance in this area, the courts and
commentators have been divided on whether to extend professorial speech rights
beyond those of non-academic public employees.15 9 In particular, the Seventh
Circuit'6 0 may currently be less open to thus extending professorial speech rights
based on academic freedom considerations than are the Fourth'6' and Ninth
Circuits. 162
157 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427, 438 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter cited a number of the
most familiar academic freedom related cases, including Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003)
("the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment");
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967) ("[o]ur nation is deeply committed to safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us"); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (academic freedom as an area "in which government should be extremely
reticent to tread"). See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) ("[t]he college classroom with
its surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas'"); Keyishian, supra, at 603 ("[t]
he classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas"'). But see Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,
412 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("[t]he Supreme Court, to the extent it has constitutionalized a right of
academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized only an institutional right of self-governance in
academic affairs").
158 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
159 For a sense of the judicial division in this area, see the discussion in Klaassen v. Univ. of
Kansas School of Medicine, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1251 (D. Kan. 2015). For a sense of the university
reaction, see, e.g., Robert M. O'Neil, The AAUP in the Courts, available at www._aautogorg/article
aaup--courts (January-February, 2015) (visited February 21, 2016); Modern Language Association
Committee on Academic Freedom, Ramifications of the Supreme Court's Ruling in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, available at www.mh.o 'Rsure Research /Surve (2010) (visited February 21,2016).
160 See Renken v. Gregory, 541 E3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Renken made his complaints
regarding the University's use of NSF funds pursuant to his official duties as a University professor.
Therefore his speech was not protected by the First Amendment"). Note, though, that the speech
in question may seem more administrative than classically scholarly or pedagogical in nature. See
Recent Case, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1823, 1828 (2014) (emphasizing such a distinction).
161 See Adams v. Trustees of Univ. of N.C., 640 E3d 550, 563 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
professional speech involved "scholarship and teaching" as distinct from "declaring or administering
university policy").
162 See Demers v. Austin, 746 E3d 402, 411-12 (7th Cir. 2011) (Garcetti .. . consistent with the
First Amendment, cannot . . . apply to teaching and academic writing that are performed 'pursuant
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The most crucial reason for disagreements over the proper scope of any
distinctive protection for academic speech draws upon inevitable conflicts among
purported basic purposes or functions of the university. Of course, one's general
assessment of the functions of an institution does not by itself decide concrete
cases.' But diverging conceptions of the basic functions of the university will
inevitably be crucial to our contested notions of individual, as well as institutional,
academic freedom.1 64
There may well be occasions on which even some single, agreed upon basic
university function itself points in opposing directions.'6  But the broader and
more typical conflicts will involve contradictions between and among the several
purported basic university functions. In particular, whether we think that the
above Garcetti test, without further constitutional level modification,1 66 should be
applied broadly to public university professorial speech in the realms of teaching
and scholarship will ultimately reflect what we think about university functions,
and their prioritizing.
Thus we will tend to resist extending a constitutionally unmodified Garcetti
rule into public university academic speech if we choose to think of university
function in terms of individual, if not institutional, free thought and expression;'67
the advancement and dissemination, internally or externally, of knowledge;'6
disinterested scholarship;1 69 or of the university as a center for independent
thought, by individuals if not at the institutional level,1 70 at least if the speech at
issue is not otherwise inconsistent with other acknowledged university missions.
to the official duties' of a teacher and professor"). Demers cites Adams, supra note 161, as well as
the Grutter, Keyishian, and Sweezy cases, supra note 157. See also Leonard M. Niehoff, Peculiar
Marketplace: Applying Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Public Higher Education Context, 35 J. College
& U.L. 75 (2008) (noting critiques of the extensions of Garcetti into academic freedom contexts);
Kermit Roosevelt, III, Not As Bad As You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 631, 658-59 (2012) (Garcetti as it stands, or with only limited modification, as protecting the
university's institutional decision making autonomy, assuming the appropriate availability of tenure
systems, civil rights and anti-discrimination statutes, and whistle-blower protection statutes).
163 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[g]eneral
propositions do not decide concrete cases").
164 For background, see D.W. Hamlyn, The Concept of a University, 71 Phil. 205, 207-09 (1996)
(noting certain inevitable limitations on a university's institutional autonomy, given substantial
external funding for partly externally chosen purposes).
165 Legendarily, in a faculty hiring context, Professor Bertrand Russell's potential interest
in speaking freely about university campus lifestyle issues once came into conflict with particular
conceptions of a university as promoter of civic responsibility and of student character and virtue.
See the remarkable case of Kay v. Bd. of Educ., 18 N.Y.S. 2d 821 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 20 N.Y.S.2d
1016 (App. Div. 1940). See supra note 48. Or consider, say, a faculty member's deep critique of a
student's basic abilities.
166 Note the qualifications referred to in Roosevelt, supra note 162, at 658-59.
167 See supra notes 25, 34 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
170 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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But these considerations clearly do not exhaust the widely recognized and
endorsed basic functions of a university, public or private. We will tend to favor
something like a Garcetti rule, all else equal, in academic speech cases if we instead
choose to think of university functions in institutional or hierarchy-governed
terms, whether the governing hierarchy is internal, in the form of a university
administration, or external, as in the form of corporate stakeholders, a board of
trustees, a legislature, or other elected officials. For those who choose to prioritize
the university's economic production or market sorting and signaling functions; 7 '
or training professionals to accommodate and enter into markets; 72 or generally
re-inscribing existing social hierarchies, the individual speech-restrictive Garcetti
rule may be unobjectionable, or a matter of indifference. 7 1 Visions of the university
as an ultimately hierarchical community, or set of such communities,1 74 also seem
better attuned to something like an unmodified Garcetti rule, even at some cost in
purely individual academic expression.
We should thus expect a consensus on the proper role of relatively restrictive
Garcetti-like rules for professorial speech only when we reach a corresponding
consensus, not presently envisionable, on the putative basic functions of the
university.
VI. Plurality of Basic University Function and
the Speech of Students Transitioning to Professions
To what extent should universities censure speech and beliefs of students
formally aspiring to a particular profession, where such speech or beliefs if held
by a practitioner would be formally deemed unprofessional by the major official
oversight body of that profession? This broad and increasingly important 7 1
question has arisen in several recent cases, including the exemplary Tatro v.
University of Minnesota. 7
Tatro involved the imposition of university discipline on a professional program
student for her personal Facebook posts, allegedly in violation of university
curricular program rules requiring discretion and confidentiality, and reflecting
both official professional ethical standards formally binding on practitioners, and
171 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text, and classically, the designated foils critiqued
in Thorstein Veblen, supra note 69.
172 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
173 As in some interpretations of the sources cited in notes 60-61 supra and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
175 See Robert J. Gordon, The Rise and Fall of Growth 649 (2016) ("the percentage of jobs
subject to occupational licensing has expanded from 10 percent to 1970 to 30 percent in 2008").
176 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). This discussion assumes that the student speech bears a
sufficient nexus to the university, and that the speech cannot reasonably be attributed to the university
itself.
23
program accreditation standards binding on the university.'77 On the record, the
court in Tatro held the university program rules to be sufficiently well-established,
non-pretextual, and sufficiently narrowly tailored to the appropriately weighty
interests at stake.7 8
In this general run of cases, the judicial results have been mixed.17 9 A distinction
between straightforwardly applying a legitimate university professional program
rule, and penalizing officially disfavored student speech,180 may or may not always
be dispositive, or even readily drawn. Any free speech analysis of such cases must
also recognize the irony that in this context, university students, and graduate or
professional school students in particular, may be subject to speech restrictions not
imposed upon elementary or high school students.'
A functionalist approach would suggest that campus speech restrictions
imposed upon mature graduate students but not on sixteen year old high school
students may well be accommodating differences in the basic functions of high
schools 8 2 and of universities. But as we would by now expect, conflicting
judgments as to university student speech in tension with professional program
standards most deeply reflect conflicting visions and priorities among basic
university functions. Consider, by way of illustration, language from the recent
Ninth Circuit Oyama case:
The importance of academic freedom at a public university does not disappear
when one walks down the hall from a political philosophy seminar to a
professional certification program. . . . Indeed, the progress of our professions . .
may depend upon the "discord and dissent" of students training to enter them:
it is by challenging the inherited wisdom of their respective fields that the next
generation of professionals may develop solutions to the problems that vexed
177 See id. at 516, 517, 520.
178 See id. at 521, 523. For helpful commentary on Tatro and related cases, see Emily Gold
Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification Cases, 11 First Amend. L.
Rev. 382 (2013); Mark A. Cloutier, Note, Opening the Schoolhouse Gate: Why the Supreme Court
Should Adopt the Standard Announced in Tatro v. University of Minnesota to Permit the Regulation
of Certain Non-Curricular Speech in Professional Programs, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 1659 (2014).
179 Consider the more and less student speech-protective outcomes in Oyama v. University
of Hawaii 813 E 3d 850 (2015) (9th Cir. 2015); Ward v. Polite, 667 E3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012); Keeton v.
AndersonWiley, 664 E3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 E3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
180 See Oyama, 813 E3d at 860.
181 For an introduction to whether public high school student free speech rules should generally
apply to more mature college and university students, see Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005)
(en banc). See also Eric Posner, Universities are Right-and Within Their Rights-to Crack Down
on Speech and Behavior, available at wwwsategomrn aticles (February 12, 2015) (visited February
21, 2016) (interrogating the distinction in maturity level between college and high school students).
Much more broadly, see Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (adult speech not to be held legally
hostage to only that which is fit for children).
182 For a classic, if doubtless less than comprehensive, statement, see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (education as today linked to good citizenship, socialization, later training, and
discharge of public responsibilities).
24
their predecessors.'
On the other hand, we would also strongly sympathize with a school that refused to
professionally certify a medical student who consistently and carefully denied, in
curricular or non-curricular speech, any causal relation between any prescription
drugs, or surgery, and patient health.18 4
Whatever the outcome in any case not based sheerly on arbitrary dislike of
the student's viewpoint, conflicting understandings of basic university functions
will underlie any debate on the merits of that case. Cases involving the speech
of students transitioning into professions will often involve a conflict, classically
noted by Robert M. Hutchins, "between . . . the pursuit of truth for its own
sake, and . . . the preparation of men and women for their life work."' 5 And
in any case in which the transitioning professional would arguably deny equal
treatment to prospective clients, there is also a conflict between, for example, the
University of Cambridge's two most fundamental values: "freedom of thought
and expression,"' 6 on the one hand, and "freedom from discrimination,""' as
practiced by or received from certified graduates, on the other.
More broadly, the transitioning professional cases evoke the university functions
of free expression and communication;' the university as the locus of individual-
level critique of society and culture;18 9 and the asking, again at an individualized
level, of questions with which the broader culture may be uncomfortable.1 90 These
considerations will generally tend to favor the dissenting student speaker's case.
But no less, the transitioning professional speech cases will also inevitably evoke
a sense of the university's responsibilities to its various external constituencies,
including taxpayers and consumers of vital, licensed services provided by its
183 Oyama, 813 E3d at 863-864.
184 Note that a graduate student in astronomy who intends solely to tout the explanatory
and predictive power of astrology poses, in the absence of any fraud or deception, a much less
disturbing case. Further afield, a professorial tenure candidate whose research and teaching interests
universally strike institutional and external peers as bizarre, trivial, groundless, or eccentric, and
as uninterestingly and unprovocatively so, should not rely on a sensible approach to individual
academic freedom to save the tenure case. For background, see, e.g., the 1940 AAJP Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, available at www.aaup.r 'port/1940tatement
princLesacad emi(visited February 4, 2016). On presumed academic
competence, see Robert C. Post, Academic Freedom and Legal Scholarship, 64 J. Legal Educ. 530, 533
(2015).
185 Hutchins, supra note 69 and accompanying text. See also Thaddeus Metz, A Dilemma
Regarding Academic Freedom and Public Accountability in Higher Education, 44 J. Phil. Educ.
529 (2010) (noting possible conflicts between pursuing knowledge for its own sake and benefiting
society).
186 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
187 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
188 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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graduates.' 9' The university as provider of trained, knowledgeable, responsible
professionals 92 arguably fails in that respect to the extent that it knowingly
certifies licensed professionals who would betray basic norms binding on vital
service providers and reasonably anticipated by consumers.1 93 Basic function-
level conflicts are again inevitable.
VII. Conclusion
This survey of the major presumed functions of the university, generally and as
reflected in several particular campus speech contexts, explains at a fundamental
level the irresolvability of typical campus speech issues. Such issues will be
irresolvable to the extent that they reflect persisting conflicts of vision as to the
basic functions of the university.
It is certainly possible to think of the university, and speech therein, in terms
that make no direct and explicit reference to any university function. 0 n e
could, for example, adopt a sophisticated utilitarian approach to the scope and
limits of speech on campus. Or one could think in terms of human flourishing,
and of relevant virtues and vices, in the context of campus speech. Inevitably,
though, such approaches must at some level address, incorporate, and crucially
depend upon some account of the basic university functions inventoried above.
No sensible approach to campus speech can bypass the relevant ongoing practical
contradictions among such functions. Thus as long as visions of the basic
university functions remain locked in crucial practical contradiction, the broad
problem of the proper scope and limits of campus speech must remain unresolved.
191 See supra notes 39-41, 52 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
193 The literature on individual and institutional academic freedom in general is of course
immense. Beyond the works cited above, see, e.g., The Concept of Academic Freedom (Edmund
L. Pincoffs ed., 1975); Judith Butler, Exercising Rights, in Who's Afraid of Academic Freedom? 293
(Akheel Bilgrami & Jonathan R. Cole, eds.) (2015) (emphasizing the basic material prerequisites
of academic freedom); J. Peter Byrne, The Social Value of Academic Freedom Defended, 91 Ind.
L.J. 5 (2015); Stanley Fish, It's Not About Free Speech or Academic Freedom, available at www
(November 23, 2015) (visited February
5, 2016); Aziz Huq, Easterbrook On Academic Freedom, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1055 (2010); Robert
Post, Why Bother With Academic Freedom?, available at htR:L/di-italcommons. l
fss pan' s493(i (2013) (visited February 5, 2016); Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic
Freedom?, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 907 (2006); Ellen Schrecker, The New McCarthyism in Academe,
Thought and Action 103 (Fall, 2005); Robert J. Zimmer, Address Delivered at Columbia University
Conference on "What Is Academic Freedom For?," available at https //resident uciaicao.edn/
page/-addre~s detivered-coluimba-uniersity (October 21, 2009) (visited February 5, 2016).
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